AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THREATS AND
THEIR ILLEGALITY: BLACKMAIL,
EXTORTION, AND ROBBERY
STEVEN SHAVELLt

The subject of this Article is the making of threats and the
working of, and social need for, laws against them. I emphasize
blackmail-by which I mean threats to expose information unless
money (or something else of value) is surrendered-but I devote
attention also to extortion (threats to cause injury to a person or to
his property in the future) and to robbery (threats to do immediate
physical harm to a person), as well as to certain commonly made
threats that are not illegal (for example, threatening to withdraw
business unless price is lowered). 1
Section I of the Article is concerned with a purely descriptive,
theoretical analysis of threats, assuming that parties act in a largely
self-interested way and with due forethought. 2 The point I initially
consider is that to the degree that threats will yield gains, potential
threateners will invest effort in obtaining information for purposes
of blackmail and, more generally, in placing themselves in positions
allowing them to make threats. Likewise, to the extent potential
victims fear threats, they will endeavor to avoid becoming vulnerable
to threats. This preparatory behavior of threateners and of victims
will be affected by legal rules that punish threats. By reducing the
anticipated return from threats, the rules discourage threateners
from devoting effort to the making of threats and lead victims to do
less to protect themselves from threats.

t Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Louis
Kaplow and A. Mitchell Polinsky for comments, Paul Taylor for research assistance,
and the National Science Foundation for research support.
1 The term "blackmail" is sometimes interpreted more broadly than it is here, to
encompass extortion. In fact, the early meaning of blackmail was limited to threats
to do physical harm. For a recent discussion of blackmail and extortion, see James
Lindgren, Unravelingthe Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673-76 (1984);
for an extensive description of blackmail and extortion in English law, see Glanville
L. Williams, Blackmail, 1954 CRiM. L. REV. 79; and for an examination of the
evolution of the crimes of robbery, blackmail, and extortion in English law, see
W.H.D. Winder, The Development of Blackmail, 5 MOD. L. REV. 21 (1941).
2 This feature of the analysis (along with its consequentialist normative aspect, to
be described) is, of course, the hallmark of "economic" analysis of law and explains
the use of the word in the title of the present Article.
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After examining behavior preparatory to threats, I investigate
the actual making of threats, focusing on the very real question of
how a threat can succeed. A person making a threat faces a double
problem. On one hand, his threat must be credible. The intended
victim must believe there to be a significant chance that the threat
will be carried out if and only if he does not accede to it; otherwise,
he may have insufficient reason to bow to the will of the threatener.
On the other hand, the victim must believe that if he does reward
the threatener, he, the victim, will gain thereby and not merely set
himself up for further threats. These difficulties may render success
in threat-making somewhat problematic, and I discuss partial
solutions to them for threateners (for instance, I suggest that
although the second difficulty involving repeated demands is often
inevitable, a threatener may still be able to induce his victim to pay
if the amount repeatedly demanded is appropriately small).
Difficulties in making threats combined with possibilities of
miscalculation lead to the risk that demands will be rejected and
threats actually executed.
In Section II of the Article, I inquire about the social undesirability of threats and the social advantages of laws punishing them.
In so doing, I employ a consequentialist notion of social welfare and
evaluate threats with reference to their three types of effect: (1)
those concerning threateners' and victims' preparatory behavior; (2)
the anxiety and worry suffered by victims (whether or not threats
ultimately are carried out); and (3) results flowing from the carrying
out of threats or the satisfaction of demands. In examining the
utility of legal rules for discouraging undesirable threats, I consider,
among other things, the virtues of punishing preparatory behavior
versus punishing the making of threats versus punishing the
execution of threats.
In both sections, I apply the analysis to the three major types of
threats.3 Regarding blackmail, I am naturally led to consider issues
surrounding the social versus the private harm (or good) done by
disclosure of information, and also issues involving the reporting of
crime and law enforcement. The latter arise when the information
a blackmailer threatens to reveal pertains to commission of a crime,
for then blackmail itself might be thought to serve as a supplementa4
ry form of punishment.

3 See supra note I and accompanying text.
4 I argue, however, that rewards for reporting crime are superior to blackmail as
a device for enhancing law enforcement, so that blackmail should be illegal even when
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In Section III of the Article, I offer concluding remarks. I
should also say at the outset that I do not achieve any striking
novelty here; I depend in many respects on the recent thoughtful
analyses of blackmail by Landes and Posner, Ginsburg and Shecht5
man, and Lindgren.
I. DEscRIPTIvE ANALYSIS OF THREATS

A. BehaviorPreparatoryto the Making of Threats
A person must often engage in certain preparatory activity to
place himself in a position allowing him to make a threat. To carry
out blackmail, a person must obtain information about the intended
victim that the latter does not want revealed. To commit robbery,
a person must find a potential victim in circumstances where he
could not defend himself or secure help. Of course, it could be that
a person fortuitously finds himself in a position allowing him to
make a threat, as where a person chances upon information
embarrassing to another. But individuals frequently undertake
purposeful activity to gain advantages permitting them to make
threats.
Similarly, potential victims of threats will want to reduce their
vulnerability to threateners; they can do this in two ways. First, they
can diminish the scale of the activities that expose them to risk. A
person worried about the risk of blackmail from his infidelity can
lower the number of unfaithful acts in which he engages; a person
worried about the risk of blackmail from commission of a crime can
reduce the number of crimes he commits; or a person worried
the blackmail information concerns criminality. See infra text accompanying notes 3738.
5 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmai" An Economic Analysis of
the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 passim (1993); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-44 (1975); Lindgren,
supra note 1, passim. I am also informed by the following articles examining
blackmail from an economic perspective: Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle
Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Daniel Ellsberg, The Theory and Practice
of Blackmail, in BARGAINING:

FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 343 (Oran R.

Young ed., 1959); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmai4 Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983);
Richard A. Posner, Blackmai4 Privacy,andFreedom ofContract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817
(1993). The present Article appears to add to the existing economically oriented
literature chiefly in its descriptive analysis of threat-making. It also differs, though,
in various ways in its normative analysis (see especially the discussion of whether
blackmail is socially undesirable when the information that might be disclosed
concerns a crime) and is more general in that it considers different types of threats.
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about robbery can reduce the number of times he is out and about
at night. Second, a person can take precautions to lower the
likelihood of threats given the scale of his activity. For instance, a
person who has arranged a meeting with a lover in a hotel room can
exercise the precaution of checking for hidden cameras and can
double-lock the door.
The general influence of legal rules on the preparatory behavior
of threateners and of victims is apparent. Rules that penalize the
making of threats or their execution lower the expected return from
this activity, 6 and thus should lower the preparatory effort expended by potential threateners setting up threats.
Threateners'
preparatory efforts will also fall if such effort is itself punished (for
instance, if drilling peepholes to be employed subsequently to
obtain information for blackmail is penalized). A reduction in
threateners' preparatory efforts will in turn lead potential victims
not to fear threats as much, and will therefore increase the scale of
the activities that expose them to risk and reduce their precautions.
B. The Making of Threats: A Basic Model
Let us now assume that a threatener is in a position to make a
threat and discuss a simple model in which threats are made only
once. 7 Here, the central issue will be the credibility of the threat,
by which is meant the victim's belief that the threat will be carried
out if and only if he does not satisfy the demand made of him.
Consider Figure I on the following page.
As illustrated, threatener T makes a demand of victim V, which
V either accepts or rejects, and then T either carries out his threat
or does not. Assume as well that if T carries out his threat, he will
bear a cost or enjoy a benefit and that V will suffer a harm.
What constitutes rational behavior for the parties in this
situation? V should often reject Ts demand because his threat will
not be credible. Specifically, suppose that it is costly for T to carry
out his threat. Then Twill do nothing whether or not V accepts his
demand, so V should reject it. Similarly, suppose that it will give T
pleasure to carry out his threat. Then T will carry out his threat
whether or not V accepts his demand, so again V should reject it; he
would gain nothing by accepting the demand.

6 See infra part I.B.

7 For discussion of repeated threats, see infra part I.C.
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FIGURE I
MAKING THREATS: THE SINGLE DEMAND MODEL

V accepts

V

T carries out threat

T does nothing
T makes demand
V rT

carries out threat

Vrejects
T does nothing

Plainly, for it to be rational for V to accept T's demand, it must
be that Ts threat will be carried out if, but only if, V rejects the
demand; for then V will profit by meeting the demand. When will
Ts threat be carried out if and only if his demand is rejected?
8
Several answers suggest themselves.
One possibility is that T will bear zero cost in carrying out his
threat (as might nearly be true if the threat is to shoot a robbery
victim or to reveal information about a blackmail victim). In this
case, T will be happy to carry out his threat if his demand is
rejected, and also happy not to carry it out if his demand is
accepted. In other words, a statement that T would carry out his
threat if and only if his demand is rejected is credible (even though
barely so).
A second possibility is that T has the psychological makeup
whereby he would become angry about rejection of his demand. If
so, T would want to carry out his threat if his demand is rejected,
but may not want to do so if it is accepted, perhaps because he
8

Seegeneraly THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52, 81-203

(1960) (discussing how parties may make their threats credible and specifically
mentioning among other elements the third and fourth possibilities noted below);
Ellsberg, supra note 5, at 343-63 (amplifying Schelling's points in the context of
blackmail).
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would then feel grateful or because there is a cost to carrying out
9
the threat.
A third possibility is of an entirely different nature: that T will
make a contract to have the threat carried out by a third party if
and only if his demand is rejected. Such a contract, if legally or
10
otherwise enforceable, may make Ts threat credible.
A fourth and closely related possibility is that T has an interest
in establishing and maintaining a reputation of carrying out threats
if and only if his demands are rejected-because T is in the business
11
of making threats.
Suppose, then, that for any of these reasons, Twill carry out his
threat if and only if his demand is rejected. When would his
demand be accepted? The answer, in the model of Figure I, is that
it would be accepted as long as its amount did not exceed the harm
that V would suffer were the threat carried out. If T has accurate
knowledge of the harm that V would suffer, he will demand exactly
12
this amount, extracting the maximum from V.
Imperfect information, however, can lead to rejection of
demands and execution of threats. If T overestimates the harm to
V, T may demand more than V would be willing to pay; V will thus
13
rationally reject the demand, and T will then carry out his threat.
Another way that imperfect information may lead to inefficient
9 A numerical example may be useful here. Suppose that if his demand were
rejected, T would obtain a benefit of 10 from carrying out the threat, whereas if his
demand is accepted he would bear a cost of 5 from carrying out the threat; in either
case, if he does nothing, his gain is 0. If Ts demand is rejected, he will dearly carry
out his threat, for a gain of 10 exceeds 0; but if his demand is accepted, he will not
carry out his threat because he would rather gain 0 than lose 5.
10 I say "may" because there are a variety of difficulties that may arise with such
contracts (apart from ensuring their enforceability). Suppose, for example, that T
would derive pleasure from revealing information about V. Even if he made a
contract with a third party for that party to reveal information if and only if his
demand were not met, if his demand were met, Thimself would still have an interest
in revealing the information. Hence, accepting T's demand would do V no good.
11 Equivalently, T may sell his ability to make a threat (as by selling embarrassing
information) to such a business.
12 Suppose that the harm Vwould suffer if the threat is carried out is 100 and that
T's threat is credible. If T knows that 100 is the harm V would suffer, T will know
that any demand he makes up to 100 will be accepted by V, so Twill ask for 100 (or
just under 100), and V will be willing to pay that amount.
15 If T thinks the harm that V would suffer is very likely to be 100 and very
unlikely to be 50, T will rationally demand 100: for usually this amount will be
accepted, and when it is not, all that happens-assuming the situation in note 9,
supra-isthat T gets angry and carries out his threat, gaining 10 instead of 100. The
alternative of obtaining 50 for sure is not as good. Thus, when the harm V would
suffer is indeed 50, V will reject T's demand of 100, and Twill carry out his threat.
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decisionmaking is that V may mistakenly think that T will not carry
out his threat and thus reject it, only to see the threat carried
out.

14

Finally, consider the question whether T will want to make a
demand in the first place (assuming that he is in the position to do
so). The answer depends on the return he can expect from a
demand, and the cost of making it and of possibly carrying out a
threat. In the simplest case, where he and V have perfect information and T's demand is credible, Twill obtain a gross return equal
to the harm to V, so he will make a threat if the expected costs of
so doing are less than this amount. If T's information is imperfect,
he will compare his expected return to his expected costs.
How do legal rules affect the behavior of parties, given that a
threatener is in a position to make a threat? Rules that penalize the
making of threats and their execution will generally increase the
expected cost of making threats, and thus reduce the number of
occasions in which a threatener will decide to make a threat. The
threshold of gross return from a threat will have to be higher before
a person who is in a position to make a threat will decide to do so.
Furthermore, such rules may limit the circumstances in which
threats are credible and reduce the probability that a threatener will
make a threat.
To amplify this discussion, consider how the probability of
detection and conviction for a threatener is determined. First, by
making a threat, he suffers a risk of capture, as someone, especially
the victim, may obtain proof of his behavior. Second, the victim's
acceptance of a threatener's demand provides an additional
opportunity for proof of his behavior to be obtained.1 5 Third, the
carrying out of a threat may affect the probability of detection. In
some contexts, executing a threat will increase the chances of
detection, for it may furnish an additional opportunity for proof of
a threat to be obtained. Also, the carrying out of a threat may
In the example given in note 9, supra, suppose that, contrary to fact, V thinks
it very likely that T will bear a cost of 5 in carrying out his threat whether or not V
rejects the demand. V will not believe that Twill carry out the threat if he rejects the
demand, so that V will reject T's demand, and T will carry out his threat.
15 A complication with regard to a discovery that T is accepting payments is that
this in itself may well not be illegal. If it is not illegal, then Ts acceptance of
payments must be combined with other evidence for it to help in convicting T of
making threats. Similarly, T's execution of a threat may not be illegal (suppose the
threat is to expose information) and thus must be combined with other evidence to
assist in convicting T. For further discussion on this point, see infra part II.B.
14
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increase the incentive of the victim or someone else to report the
threat, as where a blackmail victim, having been exposed, no longer
has anything to fear from reporting, or where a robbery victim
becomes angry and wants revenge. It is possible, however, that the
carrying out of a threat will reduce the probability of detection (for
instance, if the threat is to kill the victim, thereby eliminating a
source of information about the threat). If, though, the carrying
out of a threat would increase the exposure of the threatener to
detection, then the likelihood that his threat would be credible
would be reduced by the presence of the legal rules under consideration.
Of course, the magnitude of the effect of legal rules depends
importantly on the probability of detection and conviction, and this
in turn depends on the likelihood of observation by third parties or
the report of threats by victims.
C. The Making of Threats: Model with Repeated Demands
Let us now examine an extension of the basic model allowing
for the possibility of repeated demands and repeated threats. In
this version of the model, the new issue that arises is that if the
victim accepts an initial demand, that may well not result in his
being free from further demands. Consider Figure II on the
following page.
The assumption is that after V accepts or rejects, T has the
option of making another demand in addition to the option of
carrying out his threat or doing nothing. It is also assumed that the
situation portrayed repeats itself, that after V accepts or rejects a
possible second demand, there may be a third demand, and so
on.

16

6

The diagram reflects the implicit assumption that Twill not resume bargaining

if he ever carries out his threat or does nothing. This assumption is made for
simplicity but has justification in certain situations. For instance, in blackmail, if T

carries out his threat and exposes information, he no longer can carry out a threat.
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FIGURE II
MAKING THREATS: THE MULTIPLE DEMAND MODEL
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T does nothing
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T does nothing
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To understand the new issue, assume that T's threat is crediblethat he will carry out his threat at any stage if and only if his
demand is rejected (for concreteness, one might assume that T
would become angry if his demand were rejected). Now consider
Ts decision if V accepts his initial demand. T will be best off
making a new demand if there is any probability that it will be
accepted. 17 Moreover, this logic applies at every stage. Hence,
both T and V will realize that T will be making repeated demands.
What does this imply? It implies that what V purchases when he
makes a payment to T is freedom from the threat for one period,
until T makes the next threat. Hence, for V to be willing to pay T,
Ts demand each period must be "small," equal only to the value of
freedom from the threat during the periods between demands. A
succession of payments of this size is, however, quite rational for V
17 If T makes a new threat, he will obtain a positive expected return. If he does
nothing more, he obtains zero. If he carries out his threat, he gains nothing or bears
a cost. Hence, T would make a new demand.
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to make.18 Further, notice that there is a self-reinforcing aspect of
the situation under discussion: both V and T know that if T were
ever to carry out his threat, he would as a consequence lose all
future payments-he would be killing the goose that lays the golden
eggs. This should make T want to continue to refrain from carrying
out his threat as long as he is paid, giving V greater confidence that
T will do so as long as V continues payments.
Several observations are worth making about these conclusions.
First, the outcome in which V makes repeated payments to T may
be inferior in the eyes of both V and T to an outcome in which a
single payment is made (with a present value equal to that of the
stream of repeated payments). A single payment may be preferred
by both parties because it would reduce bargaining and transaction
costs; it might be preferred by V because it would mean an early
end to worry and anxiety, and by T for liquidity reasons. If the
parties want to arrange a single payment, they must somehow avoid
their joint problem that T will have an incentive to make repeated
demands. One way in which a single payment could be arranged is,
in principle, for T to give V the power to threaten him when the
first payment is made. Notably, as I will discuss subsequently in the
context of blackmail, T could give V information that T would not
want revealed; thus, after the first payment, V and T would each be
able to threaten each other, and hence, after a single payment, there
might be no more demands. Another way in which the problem
might be solved is that T may be in the business of making threats
and thus, as discussed above, want to maintain a reputation that will
inure to his long run benefit. If so, T would have a reason to drop
19
the matter after V made a single payment.
A complete example may be helpful. Suppose that, as in note 9, supra, if 7's
demand is ever rejected, he would become angry and obtain a benefit of 10 from
carrying out his threat, but whenever his threat is accepted, he would sustain a cost
of 5 were he to carry out his threat. Suppose as well that if T ever carries out his
threat, V will suffer a loss of 20 for each and every period thereafter. In this
situation, it is reasonable for T to demand 20 (orjust under this amount) and to have
the strategy of carrying out his threat if and only if any demand is rejected. Also, it
is reasonable for V to pay 20 every period. In the terminology of game theory, this
constitutes a perfect equilibrium. Specifically, if T has the stated strategy, it is
obviously rational for V to accept 7's demand each period. 7's strategy is also
rational for him to pursue at each stage, for if he ever carries out the threat or drops
the matter, the game is over and he obtains less than 20, whereas if he makes another
demand he will obtain 20. While this is only an example, I conjecture that it
illustrates the nature of a solution to the repeated threat model under wide
conditions. (This model, it seems, deserves to be studied formally.)
19 Similarly, T could conceivably contract with a third party to make only a single
18
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This is not to say, however, that V and T will necessarily want to
arrange a single payment. T may prefer a stream of payments
because only in this way can he extract a share of V's future
earnings. If V receives income over time from employment or a
business (and cannot borrow against future earnings), then the only
way T can obtain a significant share of V's income is to take it in a
series of payments. For this reason, if the harm that T could
impose on V by carrying out his threat is sufficiently large, T may
prefer to collect a stream of payments.
A second observation is that the possibility that imperfect
information will lead to rejection of demands and the carrying out
of threats appears to be greater in the repeated context. There are
more opportunities for demands to go wrong, to exceed what V is
willing to pay. Further, over time, the value V places on freedom
from execution of the threat may change, as may his willingness to
make payments. If T fails to gauge properly V's situation, he may
ask for too much and be rejected, and that may in turn prompt
performance of the threat.
Third, the influence of legal rules is altered somewhat in the
repeated context. The repetition of payments means that there are
more chances for T to be caught, and thus suggests that the power
of the legal rules to deter is greater than would otherwise have been
appreciated.
D. Application to Dfferent Types of Threat
1. Robbery
How do robbers make their threats credible? First, if a robber
carries a weapon that he appears to know how to employ, not only
does he have a threat that is large in magnitude, but also one which
may be easy for him to execute (to pull a trigger is virtually
effortless) and one which, if carried out, may not increase (and
could reduce) his likelihood of being caught. Hence, we may
sometimes envision the situation as one in which the cost of
carrying out a threat is small, making credibility of the threat easier
to establish. Second, the possibility that a robber may enjoy
carrying out his threat if he is thwarted may also be relevant. The
personality type given to this reaction is probably correlated with
certain characteristics of robbers (lack of education, anomie), and
demand.
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self-selection may also be at work-individuals with the personality
type may choose to become robbers. In any case, we would expect
to see attempts by robbers to convince victims that they would not
mind, or would enjoy, carrying out threats if their demands are not
met. Thus, robbers often display behavior patterns that lead victims
to believe they are confronting sociopathic individuals who will
carry out their threats. Robbers may commit minor acts (shove
someone, push a knife to a person's throat) to help persuade victims
that they are dealing with individuals who are willing to carry out
threats. Despite the various efforts of robbers to make their threats
credible, they obviously do not always succeed, and for this reason
as well as others, robbers often commit violence.
It should be remarked that the issue of repeated threats is moot
with regard to robbery. In a robbery situation, repeated threats are
not possible, as once a person turns over his possessions to the
robber, that is the end of the matter.
Legal rules against robbery undoubtedly reduce the amount of
robbery substantially, despite the incidence of this crime. If there
were no laws against robbery, the levels of precaution taken by
potential victims and the curtailment of their activities arguably
would be extraordinary, as would the efforts by robbers to commit
robbery.
2. Extortion
An extortionist's problem of making his threat credible is in
some respects more difficult than a robber's, because the extortionist's threat is not immediate and apparent and because his victim
will have time to defend himself. While extortionists probably
attempt to solve their credibility problems by the general techniques
used by robbers, it also seems that they resort more often than do
robbers to groups (neighborhood gangs, organized crime) with longterm stakes in maintaining a reputation for carrying out threats.
The threat of the extortionist often can be repeated, unlike that
of the robber, for the nature of the extortionist's threat usually
lends itself to repetition. If the threat is to burn down a store, for
instance, this can ordinarily be repeated. We would therefore
expect on the general grounds advanced above that extortion
demands would be repeated. Moreover, an extortionist frequently
would not want to arrange a single payment because the extortion
victim often earns money over time and thus will yield more if the
extortionist collects repeatedly. Thus, it is not surprising that
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extortion demands are in fact usually repeated (at least this is my
impression).
There is little to add about the effect of legal rules to what has
already been said. 20 To the extent that extortion threats are
anticipated, it would seem that there is an enhanced opportunity to
catch an extortionist, other things being equal. Moreover, since
organizations often are involved in extortion and organizations are
easier to detect than single parties, extortion may be easier to detect
than what might otherwise be supposed. The implication is not, of
course, that we would expect to see extortion stamped out, and we
do not. Rather, it is that the legal rules against extortion are
probably effective in deterring a tremendous amount of that activity;
in the absence of the enforcement of legal rules against extortion,
21
we would likely be overrun by extortionate enterprise.
3. Blackmail
It appears that a blackmailer should often face less difficulty in
making his threat credible than a robber or extortionist because the
cost of executing a blackmail threat is likely to be small by comparison. The direct cost to a blackmailer of actually carrying out his
threat is ordinarily trivial; it takes almost no effort to mail a
photograph or a document to someone. The cost to a blackmailer
of carrying out his threat probably inheres mainly in any resulting
increase in the risk of his being caught and punished. But the
blackmailer can usually reveal his information anonymously, using
the mail or the telephone. And even if he is caught revealing
information, this is not a crime (unlike the extortionist's or the
robber's threats), so it might be difficult to successfully prosecute
the blackmailer in the absence of independent evidence that he had
made a threat. All this suggests that the blackmail threat is
frequently not very hard to make credible. Accordingly, blackmailers should not usually need to rely on a group's reputation to
20

See supra parts I.A-C.

21 In areas where the legal system is ineffective or has broken down, such as in

regions of Bolivia and Colombia today, extortion is well known to engender serious
avoidance efforts on the part of potential victims, extending even to the creation of
private protective armies to act against extortionists. At the same time, the efforts
of extortionists to set up opportunities for their activities are extensive. This is a
chief occupation of certain guerrilla and bandit groups. See James Brooke,
Kidnappingand "Taxes" Transform GuerrillaInc., N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at DI.
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enhance the credibility of their threats, and it appears that blackmail
22
is usually an individual activity.
The threat of blackmail is one which can be repeated. A
blackmailer virtually always retains the ability to reveal information.
Even if he wants to extinguish his ability to reveal information,
there is usually no way to convince a blackmail victim that the
blackmailer does not have copies of photographs or other proof of
the information the victim does not want revealed. 23 This means
that the victim should expect repeated demands and that a small
stream of repeated payments will be made. This may also sometimes be seen as a problem by a blackmailer and his victim.
Although I have no direct evidence that it is so regarded, one sees
occasional reference to the issue in accounts of blackmail,24 and
one certainly sees reference to the point that demands are seldom
25
made only once.
With regard to the effect of legal rules on blackmail, it is
frequently difficult to obtain evidence that a blackmailer made a
threat. Blackmail threats are occasions in which information is
communicated, perhaps only verbally, and can ordinarily be
concealed or designed so that the blackmailer's identity cannot be
established. Moreover, the blackmailer can sometimes phrase the
threats in a nuanced way to avoid crossing the line of criminality,
even though the meaning of the threats will be clear to victims.
Further, the victim of a blackmail threat may well have an incentive
to hide the threat from the authorities, for reporting it may result
22

See, e.g., MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY

LIFE 46-60 (1975) (describing traits and accounts of blackmail by master blackmailers).
23 There are exceptions to this statement. Suppose that I am blackmailing
murderer V with the threat that I will turn over to the authorities the murder
weapon, a gun, that I have in my possession. If I instead surrender the gun to V, I
will end my ability to make further demands. But such instances appear to be rare.
24 Consider, for example, the following conversation about blackmail in a
detective novel by Lawrence Block:
"You pay it once and it's over."
"Back on Square A. How do I know that?"
"Because when you pay over the money, I give you a handle on me. I
did something a few years ago. I could go to jail for it for a long time. I can
write out a confession giving all the details. I'll give it to you when you pay
the fifty thou ....
That locks me in, keeps me from doing a thing."
Finally she said, "It might work."
LAWRENCE BLOCK, TIME TO MURDER AND CREATE 45-46 (Jove Books 1983) (1977).
25 See HEPWORTH, supra note 22, at 42 (discussing recurring demands for money
as both a feature of blackmail and frequent cause of the blackmailer's undoing).

1993]

THREATS AND THEIR ILLEGALITY

1891

in disclosure of the information he wants to keep secret. Unlike the
victim of an extortion or robbery threat, the blackmail victim may
suffer more if the threatener is brought to justice than if he is not.
It is true that there is scope for the state to protect the blackmail
victim from exposure of the information, but this will often be
impossible. 26 In addition, as explained above, the chances of
convicting a blackmailer who carries out his threat are not high.
Hence, one suspects that the ability of legal rules to prevent
blackmail is often circumscribed.
At the same time, this limitation does not mean that the rules
are of negligible effect. In their absence, it is probable that the
scope of blackmail would be vastly increased due to growth of
businesses specializing in this activity.27 All manner of activity
aimed at gathering information for purposes of blackmail would
occur, as would efforts to entice people into embarrassing situations.
Furthermore, potential victims would take protective
measures that they do not take today because of the remoteness of
the chance of blackmail.
An additional issue concerning the effect of rules against
blackmail involves situations where a blackmailer's information
pertains to the commission of a crime. In such cases, does
blackmail increase deterrence of crime, that is, the probability and
magnitude of punishment for crime?
The illegality of blackmail would seem to reduce the probability
that crime is punished, where by "punished" I mean either that the
criminal is punished by the state or by having to pay a blackmailer.
Because people will generally have less incentive to obtain information about the commission of crimes when blackmail is illegal,
criminals who would have been discovered and then blackmailed
may not be if blackmail is illegal. For instance, a neighbor of Xwho
has a suspicion that X committed a crime and would blackmail him
were this legal may not bother to investigate (say by looking for
stolen goods) due to the illegality of blackmail. It is true that the
illegality of blackmail will tend to increase the reporting of crime to
26 For instance, the time the victim spends in court may be hard to conceal from
co-workers or from a spouse, and may lead to discovery of the information that he
wants to hide. Additionally, if the information is that the person committed a crime,
he will be reluctant to go to the authorities, unless they had granted him immunity
from prosecution (even in this case, he might be reluctant to go forward).
27 See Epstein, supra note 5, at 562 ("[T]here would then be an open and public
market for a new set of social institutions to exploit the gains from [legalized
blackmail].").
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the authorities when people already have information about the
commission of a crime; 28 if X's neighbor already knows that X
committed a crime, the neighbor might report this if blackmail is
illegal but may have kept quiet and committed blackmail if the law
permitted otherwise. Such an event, however, amounts to a shift in
the medium of punishment, not in the probability of punishment.
It appears, though, that the illegality of blackmail will often tend
to increase the magnitude of punishment. As just mentioned, the
illegality of blackmail should result in people who have information
reporting it to the state more frequently than otherwise, and under
plausible assumptions the state's punishment will be more severe

than a blackmailer's. In particular, suppose that the criminal
sanction includes imprisonment and that the assets of the victim are
not very large. Then the maximum amount of money a blackmailer
could extract would create less disutility for the criminal than the
criminal sanction. For example, an embezzler with $5000 in assets
could pay a blackmailer at most $5000, but spending fifteen years
in jail would be a considerably more serious punishment. Moreover, part of the criminal sanction is public humiliation, a situation
which is avoided in a blackmail arrangement. Hence, the suspicion
is that with regard to many serious crimes, there would be a
systematic reduction in the magnitude of punishment were
blackmail allowed. The importance of this dilution in sanctions is
great when one takes into account two groups of individuals who
frequently have information about criminals but also have easy
access to the criminal justice system: law enforcement officers and
the victims of crime. If each were free to blackmail criminals, there
would be a pronounced alteration from punishment by the criminal
justice system to punishment through blackmail, with a substantial
decrease in the magnitude of punishment.
The conclusion from this analysis of the effect of the illegality
of blackmail on deterrence of crime is then ambiguous in principle,
since the likelihood of punishment should fall even though the
29
magnitude should rise.
"8Of course, many people will neither report crime nor commit blackmail, but the
illegality of blackmail can only increase reporting to the state by people who already
possess
information about crime.
29

SeeJennifer G. Brown, Blackmail asPrivateJustice,141 U. PA. L. REv. 1929,1936
(1993). The conclusion, however, treats all else as given. I will argue below that
when the possibility of rewarding people for reporting crimes is taken into account,
the conclusion will change. The legality of blackmail should not be looked upon as
needed to increase the probability of punishment, since the offer of rewards can
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4. Commonly Made Threats in Commercial Life and Other
Legally Permissible Threats
There are a multiplicity of threats that are not illegal. I will
make no attempt to characterize them, as they are so various, but
will consider three for contrast with the types of illegal threats
discussed above. The first is the typical threat made in commerce,
to withdraw business unless price (or some other term) is favorably
adjusted-for instance, a buyer's threat that he will not purchase an
item unless the price is lowered from $100 to $75. Such threats are
often made credible by the existence of alternative opportunities.
If the buyer could indeed buy the item for $75 elsewhere and the
seller knows this, the buyer's threat would be credible. The fact that
such threats may be made and carried out leads to changes in
preparatory behavior, that is, in a buyer's search for relevant
markets and a seller's efforts to lower costs enabling him to meet
demands.
A second legal threat of interest is the right of a person who
suffers a civil wrong to bring suit against the injuring party unless
he is paid an amount in settlement. This threat is made credible by
the ability of the injured party to go to court and collect a judgment. A natural question to be asked about the legality of such
threats is whether they allow substantially reduced punishment of
liable parties. It seems that they do not, at least in a comparative
sense: settlements in the civil context should not permit as much
reduction in punishment as would "settlements" of criminal cases
(legal blackmail arrangements between victims of crimes and
criminals). Contrast, for instance, the likely settlement in a civil
case in which the defendant would be liable for $50,000 with the
criminal case in which the embezzler with only $5000 in assets
would be imprisoned for fifteen years. In the civil case, the
settlement would approximate $50,000, the social sanction, whereas
in the criminal case, the settlement of $5000 would represent far
less punishment than the social sanction of lengthy imprisonment.
The source of the difference is that the civil sanction is monetary,
while the criminal sanction includes imprisonment.
A third example concerns a threat to take some action with
one's property unless one is given a payment or something else of
value in exchange. For example, a person might threaten to erect
a fence around his property that his neighbor would find objectionaccomplish that.
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able unless the neighbor agrees to constrain his bothersome dog.
Such threats may or may not be credible, depending notably on
whether the threatened act appears to be in the self-interest of the
threatening party (whether a person is really bothered by his
neighbor's dog or whether a person would find his own fence
objectionable).
II. NoRMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREATS
A. GeneralEffects of Threats on Social Welfare
The influence of threats on social welfare can be divided into
three categories. The first is the welfare consequences of threats for
preparatory behavior. As a general matter, efforts expended by
threateners putting themselves in a position to carry out threats is
a social waste; such effort is not producing anything of value for
final consumption. Similarly, precautions taken by potential victims
avoiding threats reduce social welfare. The scaling back of activities
that expose victims to the risk of threats, however, may or may not
be socially undesirable, depending on the social value placed on
those activities. If an activity is socially disapproved, such as a
criminal activity, then any reduction in its level due to threat-making
is socially desirable.
The second category is the welfare consequences of the making
of threats themselves. I mention this because the making of threats,
independently of whether they eventually are executed, can create
fear and anxiety in victims."0 This disutility, especially if it extends
over a long period, is potentially a significant detriment to social
welfare. Thus, it would seem to be most relevant in a context of
repeated threats, or at least where there is a long-lasting ability to
carry out threats. It also needs to be noted that the fear of
execution of threats is explicable in terms of our analysis. As
previously mentioned, the possibility of miscalculation by the parties
can lead to the blackmailer carrying out his threats. Accordingly, it
30 Although it is customary in economic analysis to restrict attention to actual
outcomes, such as whether a threat to expose an embarrassing fact is ultimately

carried out, in the present context it seems important to take into account the effect
of the risk of the actual outcome on the mental state of the threatened party. It
seems that when the risk surpasses some threshold, the threatened party will worry,
that is, play over in his mind what would happen if the threat were carried out, and
that this type of mental activity creates substantial disutility. If so, worry is a factor
that ought to weigh in the welfare calculus, along with any "actual outcome."
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is rational for a victim in a context of repeated threats to harbor a
fear that at some point, a threat may be carried out.
The third category is the welfare consequences flowing from
payment of demands or the carrying out of threats. If a payment is
made, we often think of this as having no welfare significance in
itself, as being a mere transfer of purchasing power, and I will make
this assumption unless otherwise noted. But what will be of
consequence to welfare is the carrying out of threats, due to
imperfect information and miscalculation. The nature of the
welfare effects of the execution of threats depends on the type of
threat. If the threat is to do harm to a person or to property, it will
lower welfare, other things being equal. If the3 1 threat is to reveal
information, it may or may not be undesirable.
The overall effect on welfare of the making of threats, therefore,
is determined by the net impact of the three sources of welfare
change due to threats.
B. Optimal Use of the Law Against Undesirable Threats
If it is desirable to discourage the making of threats because
they lead to undesirable consequences, the law can be applied at
three different stages: to the preparatory behavior of potential
threateners, to the making of the threats, and to the collection of
payments or the execution of threats.
When is it socially desirable for the law to intervene? The
answer is that if deterrence is weak, as I will suggest will often be
the case, the law should intervene at all three stages; all available
32
opportunities to deter the unwanted behavior should be taken.
With regard to the preparatory behavior of threateners, we can
imagine that if a person is setting up eavesdropping devices for the
purpose of blackmail, there is an opportunity for legal intervention.
This legal strategy, however, suffers from the difficulty in differentiating innocent behavior from that which is preparatory to the
making of threats. If, for instance, a person is prowling the halls of
31 See

infra part II.C.
This argument implicitly rests on the assumption that society cannot necessarily
raise deterrence adequately by increasing the magnitude of punishment. Hence,
society may need to increase the number of occasions in which it punishes in order
to achieve a deterrence goal. See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of
Attempts, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 435,436-37 (1990) (explainingwhy, to achieve deterrence,
it may be desirable for society to punish notjust acts that result in harm, but also acts
that happen not to-namely, attempts).
32
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a motel with a camera, it will be hard to demonstrate from this
alone that he was planning to take photographs for blackmail; or if
a person is walking the streets searching for a robbery victim, it will
be hard to demonstrate that this was his intent.
When the law is applied to the making of threats, there are also
problems with deterrence. With regard to all three types of threat,
there is the basic problem that the threatener selects his time and
method of threat-making so as to avoid detection. Blackmail, as
discussed, also involves the perversity that if the victim reports the
threat, this itself may result in the revelation of information that he
seeks to avoid. Further, as also discussed, blackmail and extortion
threats may be hard to substantiate. Altogether, then, one supposes
that the use of penalties only for the making of threats would not
be sufficient to generate adequate deterrence of threats.
When the law is applied at the third stage, where payments are
made or where threats are carried out, there again may be problems
with detection. 3 3 Consider first that it may not be easy to catch a
person collecting a payment. He can arrange a surreptitious pickup
of funds (using agents, drop-offs, and the like) or other devices
(such as "buying" property at a reduced price). Further, what if he
is caught taking money? Without any direct evidence about his
having made a threat, it might be hard to obtain a conviction of a
person who took payment, since this in itself is not illegal (a
threatener might say that he merely found money in a bag). If,
though, the person who took payment could be shown to have
directed an effort to do so secretly, a conviction would be easier.
Thus, catching a person taking payments would be likely to result
in a conviction only in the latter case or where there already existed

some, but not sufficient, evidence of threat-making (if proof of
threat-making had been sufficient, a conviction would already have
been obtained). Consider next the carrying out of threats. Again,
this will be done by threateners in such a way as to avoid detection,
and as was mentioned above, in the case of blackmail, is not a crime
in itself.
This discussion suggests that the ability to deter threats is weak
enough to warrant legal intervention at all three stages, not just at
the stage of the making of threats.

33 Here, I speak only about extortion and blackmail, as I assume that the second
and third stages of threat-making are coincident in the case of robbery.
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C. Application to Different Types of Threat
1. Robbery and Extortion
As indicated earlier, robbery and extortion generate a substantial amount of preparatory activity on the part of potential victims
and potential threateners, all of which is a social waste. Moreover,
the threats generate anxiety on the part of potential victims. With
robbery, the anxiety may be short-lived, if intense, although the
memory of the event can create disutility. With extortion, which is
likely to be repeated, the anxiety is suffered over a long period.
Also, the threats involved in robbery and extortion are to do
harm to person or property, and since threats are sometimes carried
out, this is another element that makes robbery and extortion
socially undesirable. If the threats are not carried out, there are
transfers of funds. If we regard these transfers as a wash, then there
is no more to say about them. But when extortion affects businesses, as it frequently does, product prices will often rise as a consequence. This in turn will lower social welfare in a familiar way:
consumers will be led to purchase alternative goods that they do not
really prefer and which are not really cheaper but only appear so
because of the high extortion-related price of goods sold by extorted
merchants.
In sum, the effects of robbery and extortion are unambiguously
to reduce social welfare, which justifies the use of legal rules against
these threats.
2. Blackmail
Consider first blackmail where the information that might be
disclosed pertains to a socially harmless activity orfact. An example
is engaging in conventional sexual intercourse with one's spouse, or
even taking a shower, where in either case the blackmail threat is to
reveal photographs of the activity. Note that it is perfectly rational
for the blackmail victim not to want such photographs revealed even
though the activity in question is socially harmless. Personal
modesty would lead most people not to want such photographs
revealed; a very definite positive value, perhaps high for some
people, would be put on preventing their revelation.
In such cases, blackmail is almost, but not entirely, analogous to
robbery or extortion and thus seems socially undesirable. Specifically, the efforts to undertake blackmail and the efforts to guard
against it are social wastes, and the reduction in the scale of
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potential victims' activities is a social detriment since the activities
are not harmful yet benefit those who engage in them. If people
take showers less frequently (for example, when they are in hotel
rooms), they experience a loss in utility for no socially good reason.
The making of threats also creates anxiety, which has a similar
negative effect on one's welfare.
But the influence on social welfare of the actual revelation of
information, should it occur, is ambiguous. By assumption,
revelation of information always harms the victim. However, the
effect on others of revelation of information is unclear. Consider
the case of photographs of a person taking a shower being sent to
the person's co-workers. It could be that those who see the
photographs would not enjoy viewing them in any sense; rather,
they would feel awkward, especially when in the presence of the
blackmail victim. Another possibility, though, is that people might
enjoy seeing photographs of a person taking a shower. For
example, the blackmail victim may be an extremely attractive young
woman and her male co-workers may take a prurient interest in the
photographs. Thus, in theory, it is not apparent how revelation of
information would affect social welfare.
Because the exposure of information when blackmail threats fail
may produce a net social benefit, it is theoretically possible that
blackmail is not socially undesirable even though the acts in
question are socially innocuous. This case, however, seems a rather
unlikely one (and it must always be kept in mind that the whole
issue of exposure of information is limited in importance because
it applies only when blackmail does not succeed and the blackmailer
nevertheless carries out his threat). Thus, it appears that one may
safely conclude that blackmail is generally socially harmful when the
34
act threatened to be exposed is socially harmless.
Consider next blackmail where the information pertains to a
socially harmful activity other than a crime, for example, the wasteful
but not illegal spending of church funds by a minister. The primary
difference between this case and the previous one is that here, to
the extent that blackmail reduces victims' activities, it is socially
34 This justification for the illegality of blackmail incorporates what others have
said. In particular, Ginsburg and Shechtman emphasize the notion that blackmail
encourages blackmailers to expend effort on gathering embarrassing information.
See Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 5, at 1859-65. Further, the closely related
explanation for the illegality of robbery-that it induces wasteful effort on the part of
both robbers and victims-is commonplace.
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valuable. If ministers are induced to use church funds 3more
5
responsibly because of fear of blackmail, this is a good thing.
That blackmail in the present case has the beneficial aspect of
suppressing undesirable activities, and yet causes wasteful efforts to
obtain information and to guard against blackmail, renders the
social evaluation of blackmail ambiguous. To amplify, it is not
possible to say whether the effort expended to undertake and avoid
blackmail is more or less important than its effect in reducing
undesirable activities. For example, it could be that potential
victims of blackmail can almost entirely avoid detection if they make
an expenditure of effort (suppose the minister can avoid detection
if he goes to the trouble of making all purchases with cash instead
of his credit card). If so, the primary effect of blackmail threats
would be to induce expenditure of effort, not to reduce the scale of
victims' activities, and blackmail would thus be socially undesirable.
Conversely, if there is little potential victims can do to prevent
blackmail, and its principal effect would be to reduce their undesirable activities, blackmail would be socially advantageous.
Now consider blackmail where the information that would be
revealed is that a person committed a crime. Recall from previous
discussion3 6 that blackmail should generally increase the probability that a criminal is punished in the sense that he will be blackmailed more often, but that the magnitude of punishment in the
form of blackmail will frequently be lower than the specified legal
sanctions. This means that the effect of blackmail on deterring
crime is unclear, and thus we cannot say whether or not the
blackmail of crime is socially desirable. If we allow blackmail of
thieves, then more thieves would be punished because they would
be forced to pay blackmail rather than go scot-free. On the other
hand, some thieves who today would be reported and go to prison
would instead pay modest amounts to blackmailers.
There is, however, an important factor not yet considered that
suggests that blackmail need not be viewed as necessary to increase
the likelihood of punishment. Suppose that society offers rewards
to people for identifying criminals whenever this would be socially
beneficial. Rather than inducing individuals to obtain information
by allowing them to blackmail someone, like a thief, these individu35 Additionally, if information is revealed, such disclosure is perhaps more likely
to be socially beneficial here because it may allow desirable actions to be taken as a

consequence, such as the church's more careful monitoring of its spending.
36 See supra part I.D.
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als could be equivalently induced, were that desired, by offering
them a reward equal to the amount they could obtain through
blackmail-and by making blackmail illegal at the same time. What,
though, is the affirmative argument for making blackmail illegal and
having the state impose sanctions? One reason has already been
discussed-the state can impose higher penalties, in the form of
imprisonment and the stigma accompanying criminal convictions,
than blackmailers. Thus state-imposed sanctions achieve a more
appropriate level of deterrence. Second, presuming the judicial
process has been designed to guard against errors, it is better to
have this mechanism determine punishment than blackmailers.
Third, in some circumstances, blackmailers would devote socially
excessive efforts to finding information about criminals.3 7 Hence,
my conclusion is that blackmail should be made illegal in the
8
present case.a
Two further comments are worth making about blackmail and
information about crime. First, the argument just given hardly
implies that society does not want to take advantage of the information that people have, or can readily obtain, about criminality. On
the contrary, society should seek to harness the information that
people have about criminality-this is often far more efficient than
having law enforcement officials try to obtain the information. The
argument is that society can obtain the information through the use
of rewards.
37 Landes & Posner, and recently Posner alone, have asserted that if blackmail
were legal, blackmailers would generally devote socially excessive efforts to finding
information. See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 43; Posner, supra note 5, at 182733. However, this is only a possibility, not a general tendency. Indeed, an important
example for our purposes is that when the criminal sanction includes jail, and
criminals have relatively small assets, the prospect of blackmail would hardly result
in excessive private efforts to find criminals-private efforts would be inadequate. In
addition, private incentives to find wrongdoers may be inadequate even if sanctions
are entirely monetary; this point is developed in an intellectually compelling way by
A. Mitchell Polinsky. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of
Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (1980) (concluding that "[r]egardless of relative
enforcement costs, private... enforcement leads in a wide range of circumstances
to less enforcement than public enforcement, rather than more").
38 This conclusion differs from that reached by Brown, see supra note 29, at 1943,
because I, unlike Brown, allow for the state to employ rewards. The conclusion is the
same as that of Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 42, and Posner, supra note 5, at
1823-27, but my justification for it differs from theirs. They would find the
legalization of blackmail of criminals socially undesirable because it would generally
stimulate excessive efforts to find criminals, but as I have explained, seesupranote 37,
this is incorrect.
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Second, in the case where the parties with information are law
enforcement officers, there is an additional set of disadvantages
with permitting blackmail, that is, with allowing officers to collect
privately arranged bounties from criminals as payment for their
work. Strong incentives would be created for law enforcement
officers to invent offenses and then profit from blackmail (such
incentives are not strong when individual arrests have small impact
on the well-being of enforcement officers). In addition, excessive
risk would be imposed on enforcement officers, since an officer's
pay would depend on whether he happened to make a successful
arrest. Also, officers' allocation of efforts toward detecting different
types of criminals would be skewed. For instance, a poor murderer
would not be sought after since he could not pay much, whereas a
wealthy man who got involved in a brawl would be a prime target.
Similarly, the allocation of effort among different law enforcement
tasks might be distorted; too much energy would be devoted to
activities leading to final detection and not enough to background
work. Altogether, then, the advantages of making blackmail illegal
for law enforcement officers seem eminently clear.
3. Commonly Made Threats in Commercial Life and Other
Legally Permissible Threats
The general analysis of the welfare effects of threats suggests
that the threats we discussed in Part I.D ought not be discouraged
or made illegal. First, it is obvious that threats to withdraw business
unless price or some other term is altered are usually good things.
Such threats are part of the competitive process and promote
efficiency. When a seller is induced by the prospect of threats of
withdrawal of business to operate at a lower cost, this is socially
desirable; where a threat is actually carried out and a person takes
his business elsewhere because he can secure a more favorable
arrangement, this is also socially desirable. Second, with regard to
threats to bring civil suits, it was suggested before that the settlement process does not seriously compromise deterrence, unlike
blackmail arrangements between a victim of a crime and a criminal.
Thus, a concern about deterrence is not a reason to bar civil
settlements, and their legality can be justified by the savings in
litigation costs and reduction of risk that they engender. Third,
with respect to the other types of threats mentioned herein, many
are not socially undesirable, or at least hard to delineate as suchthey are part of the normal bargaining process. A threat to fence
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off one's property unless a dog is restrained will tend to result in
the dog being restrained unless the fence is cheaper to erect. It is
true that threats made during bargaining can involve bluffs and
result in social waste (such as when a person begins to erect a fence
to demonstrate his willingness to carry forward with the threat).
But such undesirable outcomes generally emanate from the inability
of one of the parties to gauge the other side's position. In such
cases, the courts are unlikely to have information superior to the
parties and will thus be unable to intervene beneficially.
III.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

I want to conclude with several observations about the so-called
paradox of blackmail and about the economic analysis of blackmail,
extortion, and robbery.
Some writers have described the illegality of blackmail as
paradoxical in that it makes punishable the threat to reveal
information even though revealing information itself is not
punishable.39 This does not seem paradoxical, however, when
viewed through the lens of economics. We know that permitting
blackmail will lead potential victims to curtail innocent behavior and
take other steps to avoid blackmail, and also will induce potential
blackmailers to invest efforts in obtaining embarrassing information.
These effects are undesirable and warrant making blackmail illegal.
We also know that people usually have little reason to gather
embarrassing information or to reveal it if they are not profiting
from blackmail threats. Thus, there is no clear reason to make the
revelation of information unaccompanied by threats illegal.
Of course, a resolution of the paradox of blackmail need not be
cast in economic terms, that is, in terms of the effects of blackmail,
and Lindgren has criticized the economic explanation in his
influential article. One of Lindgren's primary criticisms40 concerns information that is adventitiously acquired, such as when a
workman going up a ladder happens to look into a room and sees
s9 See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 670 (noting that "[i]n blackmail, the heart of the
problem is that two separate acts, each of which is a moral and legal right, can
combine to make a moral and legal wrong"); Williams, supra note 1, at 162-63
(demonstrating that a demand and a threat can both be lawfully made, but taken
together, they constitute blackmail).

40 See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 695 (noting that "[i]f our principal concern is to
discourage people from digging up damaging information, it makes no sense to
punish people for selling innocently acquired information").
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someone in awkward circumstances. In such a case, the workman
is not induced to go up the ladder to gain an opportunity for
blackmail; he is going up the ladder anyway. Lindgren thus says,
correctly, that the illegality of blackmail in such a case cannot be
explained by a need to discourage wasteful efforts to obtain
information. Nevertheless, there is still an obvious incentive-based
reason for making blackmail illegal: to avoid being blackmailed by
workmen or others who might by chance be present, potential
victims will exercise excessive precautions or reduce their level of
innocent, yet embarrassing, activities.
Although it seems to me that economic analysis supplies a sound
justification for the illegality of blackmail, I do not think that it
offers an explanation that jurists, lawyers, or legislators generally
would find congenial. Instead, I suspect that most individuals view
blackmail as deserving of punishment because it is an act that is very
close to robbery, which they believe to be wicked, and because
blackmail involves the calculated imposition of suffering upon its
victims.
In any event, independent of any light economic analysis may
shed, or fail to shed, on why the law is as we find it, economic
analysis has its two usual virtues. First, it helps to describe behavior,
which sometimes has complex and interesting aspects (such as the
repetition of blackmail and extortion threats). Second, it aids in
making recommendations. Thus, for example, the analysis suggests
that although blackmail should be illegal even when the information
that would be exposed pertains to crimes, we should perhaps
consider making greater use of rewards for reporting crimes.

